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Describing certain types of spatial relationships between a pair of objects requires that
the objects are assigned different “roles” in the relation, e.g., “A is above B” is different
than “B is above A.” This asymmetric representation places one object in the “target” or
“figure” role and the other in the “reference” or “ground” role. Here we provide evidence
that this asymmetry may be present not just in spatial language, but also in perceptual
representations. More specifically, we describe a model of visual spatial relationship judg-
ment where the designation of the target object within such a spatial relationship is guided
by the location of the “spotlight” of attention. To demonstrate the existence of this per-
ceptual asymmetry, we cued attention to one object within a pair by briefly previewing it,
and showed that participants were faster to verify the depicted relation when that object
was the linguistic target. Experiment 1 demonstrated this effect for left-right relations, and
Experiment 2 for above-below relations. These results join several other types of demon-
strations in suggesting that perceptual representations of some spatial relations may be
asymmetrically coded, and further suggest that the location of selective attention may
serve as the mechanism that guides this asymmetry.
Keywords: spatial relationships, spatial language, relation perception, binding
INTRODUCTION
Throughout cognition, absolute values are less important than
relative values. At the earliest levels of perception, our visual sys-
tem translates local luminance into contrast (Peli, 1990). At the
highest levels of cognition, we make decisions about values (e.g.,
whether a particular gas station’s prices are “cheap”) based on
other values serving as a baseline (even when those baseline values
are irrelevant; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Here we explore an
intermediate case – our perceptual system’s representation of the
relative spatial positions of objects, e.g., “A is above B.”
The class of relations that we address is the categorical spatial
relation. Categorical denotes relations where exact metric infor-
mation is less relevant than the abstracted relational prototypes
that objects might fit, such as “left of,” or “above.” For example, a
stapler can still be to the left of the keyboard, whether it is 2′′ or
2 feet away (Kosslyn, 1987; Chabris and Kosslyn, 1998). Ratings
for how well a pair of objects match a given relational category
are subject to their fit within a rough prototype of ideal spatial
arrangements, e.g., within an ideal “above” relation, two objects
are vertically but not horizontally offset (Hayward and Tarr, 1995;
Logan and Sadler, 1996; Regier and Carlson, 2001; Carlson and
Logan, 2005).
This class of relations logically requires that objects within the
pair are assigned different “roles” in the relation, such that “A is
above B” is different than “B is above A” (Miller and Johnson-
Laird, 1976). This asymmetry property can be expressed within
spatial language by the assignment of one object as the “target”
or “figure,” and the other as the “reference” or “ground” (e.g., “the
target is to the left of the reference”). There are several properties
of objects that can guide the assignment of target and reference
status (Carlson-Radvansky and Radvansky, 1996; Taylor and Tver-
sky, 1996). As an example, small and movable objects tend to be
chosen as targets, in reference to large immobile objects (e.g., Clark
and Chase, 1974). It sounds natural to say that “The bike is to the
left of the building,” but odd to say that “The building is to the
right of the bike” (Talmy, 1983)1.
Here we argue that perceptual representations of categorical
spatial relations share this property of asymmetry. We first describe
an account where visual spatial relations are extracted by monitor-
ing the direction of shifts of the attentional “spotlight” over time.
We then suggest that the current location of the attentional spot-
light marks one object within a relation being “special,” and this
marker may be similar to the asymmetric representation of one
object as the “target” within spatial language. To test this possibil-
ity, we manipulate attention by cueing one object within a pair.
We find that people are faster to verify the relation when this cued
object is the “target” within a verbal description, consistent with
the idea that the attentional spotlight plays a role in creating a
similar asymmetry in the perceptual representation.
THE ATTENTIONAL “SPOTLIGHT”: A POTENTIAL MECHANISM FOR
MARKING THE ASYMMETRY OF A RELATION
We briefly describe a model of visual spatial relationship judg-
ment where the designation of the target object within such a
spatial relationship is guided by the location of the “spotlight” of
1 Though we focus on this particular type of spatial language, we also note that such
asymmetries are not constrained to this class of spatial language, or even spatial
language in general - they can apply to a large set of linguistic predicates, depending
on syntactic, semantic, and contextual factors (see Gleitman et al., 1996).
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attention (Franconeri et al., 2012). A primary component of a rela-
tion between two objects would be networks that represent single
objects within the ventral visual stream. This stream is hierarchi-
cally organized, such that at lower levels of the stream, networks
process incoming visual information in relatively simple ways (e.g.,
processing local orientation or brightness), while at higher levels,
the processing becomes progressively more complex (e.g., shape,
curvature; see Grill-Spector and Malach, 2004 for review). At the
most complex levels these networks do allow recognition of objects
in a way that might be used to encode spatial relations, such as
networks that respond to spatial arrangements of facial features,
the orientation of a hand, or the presence of a dark blob above a
light blob (Tanaka, 2003). However, these representations would
not suffice for flexible recognition of relations without such exist-
ing representations of a particular pair of objects in a particular
arrangement.
Importantly, the ventral stream does not always precisely repre-
sent where objects are in the visual field. Earlier levels of this stream
do focus on local areas of the visual field, and therefore represent
location precisely. But later levels represent information from pro-
gressively broader areas of the visual field, as large as entire visual
hemifields (Desimone and Ungerleider, 1989). Thus, we may know
that a cup is present, but we may not know precisely where it is.
A proposed solution to this problem is to relatively isolate pro-
cessing to specific locations in the visual field, so that any features
or objects present must be confined to that location in the visual
field, amplifying signals from that location while relatively inhibit-
ing signals from other areas (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). Thus,
localizing a given object may require that we selectively process its
location with the “spotlight” of attention. Evidence for this idea
comes from studies where participants are prohibited from focus-
ing their spotlight, resulting in localization errors (Treisman and
Schmidt, 1982). In addition, recent studies using an electrophysio-
logical technique that tracks this spotlight have shown that merely
identifying objects does not necessarily require selectively process-
ing its location, but localizing even the simplest object does appear
to require that we select its location (Luck and Ford, 1998; Hyun
et al., 2009). This selection process appears to be controlled by
parietal structures in the dorsal visual stream, which is argued to
contain a spatiotopic map of the visual field that represents the
location(s) selected by the attentional spotlight (Gottlieb, 2007;
Serences and Yantis, 2007).
Thus, the ventral stream can represent what objects are present
in the visual field, but localizing any individual object appears to
require selection of an object’s location. If so, then how might
we compare the relative spatial relationship between two objects?
Intuitively, we feel as if the relation is revealed when we spread our
spotlight of attention across both objects at once. In contrast, the
evidence above suggests that we must select objects one at a time
in order to localize them (as well as to surmount other process-
ing constraints related to object recognition, see Franconeri et al.,
2012). We have recently argued for this latter possibility, where
spatial relationships are judged with a process that isolates at least
one of the objects with selective attention (Franconeri et al., 2012).
For example, imagine judging the left/right relation between a red
and a green ball. Attending to both objects initially, the ventral
stream could represent the fact that a red and a green ball were
present in the visual field, and even that they were horizontally
arranged (because a blurred version of the objects would con-
tain a horizontal stripe). But this representation does not contain
explicit information about the relation between these objects.
To recover an explicit representation of the relation, we pro-
posed that the perceptual system might encode the spatial relation
by shifting the spotlight of selection toward one of these objects
(e.g., the red ball), and encoding the direction that the spotlight
moved (e.g., to the left; see Figure 1)2. Thus, the relations between
the objects are encoded first as (red exists, green exists, hori-
zontal arrangement), and then after the attention shift as (red
exists+ just shifted left). It is also possible that only one of the
objects is selectively attended, such that the spotlight starts at, e.g.,
the green object, producing (green exists), and shifts to produce
2 We assume a retinotopic reference system, which is adequate for performing most
relational judgments in a glance. For discussion of other types of relational judg-
ments where a retinotopic frame would not seem ideal (e.g., how one might compute
a depth relation), see Franconeri et al., 2012.
FIGURE 1 |Two variants of the visual spatial relationship judgment
model from Franconeri et al. (2012). (A) When first encountering a pair of
objects, we might select both in a global fashion, resulting in activation of
those object identities in the ventral visual stream, perhaps along with
other information such as the fact that they differ, or are horizontally
arranged. Critically, within this global attentional state we do not know the
relative positions of each object. Shifting the spotlight of attentional
selection to the left would allow the conclusion that the red object was on
the left of the arrangement. (B) A second way to encode relations would be
to isolate one object (e.g., green), and then shift attention to the other
object (e.g., red), recording the direction of the shift (e.g., left).
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(red exists+ just shifted left). In support of this idea that atten-
tion shifts are needed to perceive spatial relations between objects,
we used an electrophysiological attention tracking technique to
show that during such simple relational judgments, participants
do shift their attention in systematic ways toward one of the objects
(Franconeri et al., 2012; Xu and Franconeri, 2012).
The attention shift mechanism is not the only possible mech-
anism that the visual system might employ for judging spatial
relationships among objects (see Franconeri et al., 2012, for review;
and see Hummel and Biederman, 1992 for an alternative account).
But it is a relatively simple and parsimonious solution that makes
testable predictions. According to this account, the “visual” repre-
sentation first contains information about what objects are present
and how they are arranged (e.g., horizontally vs. vertically), and
then at a different time point this visual representation contains the
information that the red object is on the left of whatever region of
the visual field was previously attended. Therefore, the representa-
tion and understanding of more complex relations (e.g., knowing
what the most recent object was left of, or understanding relations
among even greater numbers of objects) would require broader
cognitive systems to guide the selection sequence and store the
results of that sequence.
In summary, this model predicts that the location of the spot-
light of attention marks one object within a relation as being “spe-
cial,” and this mark may be similar to asymmetric representation
of one object as the “target” within spatial language.
LINKING LINGUISTIC AND PERCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF
SPATIAL RELATIONS
One source of support for the idea that both linguistic and percep-
tual representations are asymmetric comes from demonstrations
of compatibility effects between the two representation types. For
example, Clark and Chase (1972) used “sentence-picture veri-
fication” tasks where they asked participants to verify whether
statements such as “star is above plus” or “plus is below star”
were true of an image (see also Carpenter and Just, 1975; Just
and Carpenter, 1976). In a critical experiment, when participants
were first shown the image, subsequent verification of statements
involving the word “above” were faster than those involving the
word “below.” This suggested that the “above” framing, which
marked the top object as special, was more consistent with the
visual encoding of the picture, implying that the picture’s encod-
ing represented the top object as special. In support of this idea,
when participants were asked to focus on the top object in the
initial image, this effect remained, but when asked to focus on
the bottom object, the effect partially reversed, suggesting that the
asymmetry within the visual representation could be changed, and
that this change was somehow related to attention.
The sentence-picture verification task offers the advantage that
it tests for compatibility between linguistic and perceptual repre-
sentations. Other tasks can show influences of one representation
on the other, though it is not always as clear whether those influ-
ences reflect biases as opposed to mandatory interactions. For
example, some studies show that linguistic representations can
influence perceptual processes as indexed by eye movements. In a
visual search task (e.g., finding a red vertical target among red hor-
izontal and green vertical distractors), patterns of response time
data suggested that participants were able to make use of fragments
of a description of a search target (“Is there a red vertical?”) such
that hearing only (“Is there a red. . .”) allowed them to isolate their
search to those objects. This suggests a “fluid interaction” where
language could guide attentional allocation (Spivey et al., 2001). In
another experiment, preparing to produce different descriptions
of a scene affected the ways that the eyes move across that scene
(Papafragou et al., 2008). Yet another set of tasks showed that when
observers were about to describe an object in a scene, they looked
to the object’s position before naming it (Altmann and Kamide,
1999).
Other studies show that perceptual manipulations can affect the
way that scenes are described. One study showed a series of fish
swimming toward each other, with one always eating the other.
If the predator fish (e.g., the red fish) were cued with an arrow,
observers were more likely to describe the scene actively (e.g.,
“The red fish ate the green fish”), whereas if the prey fish (e.g.,
the green fish) were cued with an arrow, the description was more
likely passive (e.g.,“The green fish was eaten by the red fish”; Tom-
lin, 1997). Similarly, another study showed that subtler attentional
cues added just before the appearance of a scene could influence
descriptions of that scene (Gleitman et al., 2007). In a scene con-
taining a man and a dog, cueing the future location of a dog was
more likely to produce descriptions such as “The dog chases the
man,” while cueing the future location of the man was more likely
to produce “The man flees the dog3.”
While these paradigms and results support important conclu-
sions about the strength and timecourse of interactions between
language and perception, we used a sentence-picture verification
task because it is uniquely suited for seeking compatibility between
the representations underlying the comprehension of the picture
and the sentence. Also, in contrast with other studies that use sev-
eral or even dozens of objects within the depicted scenes (e.g.,
Altmann and Kamide, 1999; Spivey et al., 2001), we used scenes
containing only two objects, which is well within any estimate
of the processing or memory capacity of the visual system (e.g.,
Luck and Vogel, 1997; Franconeri et al., 2007). Thus, any effects
of attention within such simple scenes should be all the more
surprising.
EXPERIMENTS
We suggest that visual representations per se can be asymmet-
ric, and that the mechanism for marking an object as special
is the exclusive attentional selection of its location. We test this
idea directly by using attentional cueing manipulations that drag
the spotlight toward one of the objects. Because these manipula-
tions are extremely rapid and subtle, and should not create strong
demand characteristics that may be present in previous studies
(e.g., Tomlin, 1997; see Gleitman et al., 2007, for discussion), they
should primarily affect visual representations. Before participants
saw the objects, they were given a question to answer about the
relation between the objects. For example, if we asked, “Is red on
the left of green?” then responses to that question might be faster if
3 But see Griffin and Bock (2000) for an argument for weaker interactions between
early stages of scene perception and the construction of linguistic descriptions of
scenes, and Gleitman et al. (2007) for detailed discussion of the differing conclusions.
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the red object appears before the green object, in the same order-
ing as the question. This question was presented several seconds
before a series of trials, so that participants were matching displays
to a memory representation of the question, and were not reading
it online during the trials.
We found that participants were faster to verify the depicted
relation when the cued object was the linguistic target, suggest-
ing that the cueing manipulation affected the format of the visual
representation of the relation. Experiment 1 demonstrated this
effect for left-right relations, and Experiment 2 for above-below
relations. These experiments were similar in spirit to past work
on sentence-picture verification suggesting asymmetries in per-
ceptual representations of simple visual relations (e.g., Clark and
Chase, 1972), except that we more explicitly tested the role of the
location of attention in establishing this asymmetry.
EXPERIMENT 1: LEFT/RIGHT RELATIONS, WITH ONE OBJECT
APPEARING BEFORE THE OTHER
We gave participants a statement to verify, followed by eight
displays containing red and green objects in both spatial arrange-
ments. To ensure that participants extract relations between colors
from the display, and not just positions of single objects, we var-
ied the absolute spatial location of both objects in a way that the
position of the first object gives no information about the relation
between the objects. We manipulated attention by displaying one
of the objects briefly before the other (Franconeri et al., 2005).
Questions were shown at the start of each eight-trial block, and
were of two possible forms. The first was similar to the ones used
by Clark and Chase (1972) (e.g., “Is red left of green?”). For the
first question type we focused our analysis on the predicted tar-
get/reference compatibility effect, where response times should be
faster when the target object (red) is cued, relative to when the
reference object (green) is cued. Note that there are other ways in
which compatibility effects could arise – we could look for effects
of whether the cued object was the object specified by the direc-
tion term (e.g., left), an object of a particular color regardless of the
question asked, or an object on a particular relative spatial location
(e.g., left or top) regardless of the question asked (Tversky et al.,
1991; Maas and Russo, 2003; Jahn et al., 2007). We did not have
strong a priori predictions for these other potential types of com-
patibility, and there were no robust effects among them. While we
focus on the target/reference effects here, analyses and graphs for
these other types of compatibility effects are in the Appendix. The
second type of question was of the form, “Which color is left?”
Here we sought a spatial compatibility effect, but were not sure
of its direction – one might expect that precueing the left object
would lead to better performance, but then again precueing the
right object would lead to “leftward motion” of the objects when
the left object appeared second. We found only weak evidence for
the former possibility, and we also note additional problems with
the interpretation of this effect in the“General Discussion”section.
We therefore focus instead on the target/reference effects from the
first question type.
Manipulations of attention with transient cues can be sensitive
to timing. As pilot data for future studies, we included several lev-
els of asynchrony between the precue display and the full display
containing both objects (33–233 ms). However, because there was
insufficient power to confidently distinguish among these levels
and their varied interactions with different types of compatibility
effects, we collapse across these timing differences in the present
description, but provide the analyses and graphs in the Appendix.
Methods
Participants. Thirty-one undergraduate students at Northwest-
ern University participated in the 25-min session in exchange for
course credit.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was controlled by a
Dell Precision M65 laptop computer running SR-Research Exper-
iment Builder. Although head position was not restrained, the
display subtended 32.6°× 24.4 at an approximate viewing dis-
tance of 56 cm, with a 1024× 768 pixel resolution, 33.6 pixels per
degree. A display with one of six questions was shown, followed
by eight trials. Figure 2 depicts examples of questions and test
displays. Questions were presented vertically as symbolic letter
abbreviations to reduce directional biasing from reading order.
The display background was gray (14.2 cd/m2). Each trial con-
sisted of the display of two circular targets, each at one of four
locations spaced equally in the horizontal direction on the display.
A black (1.1 cd/m2) circular fixation point with a diameter of 11
pixels was present between the two innermost targets at a distance
of 50 pixels to the left or right and 36 pixels above the targets.
Each target was 33 pixels in diameter. One circle was always red
(19 cd/m2) and the other circle was always green (24 cd/m2), values
that are approximately perceptually equiluminant (see Franconeri
et al., 2012).
Procedure. There were 288 experimental trials in blocks of eight
trials with each trial repeated twice for a total of 576 trials per
subject. At the beginning of each block of eight trials, partici-
pants were either instructed to indicate whether the relation was
correct or incorrect, or which target color was on the specified
side. These eight trials consisted of the combination of two start-
ing locations, two starting object color possibilities, times two
possible locations for the second object. The order within and
among these eight-trial blocks was randomized. Participants were
instructed to maintain strict fixation through each trial, even if it
this hurt their performance. At the beginning of each trial, a blank
display was presented for 800 ms, followed by a fixation point
presented for 1200–1600 ms. To minimize timing effects related
to pre-trial alerting, participants were then alerted by an audi-
tory signal 200 ms prior to the appearance of the first object. One
object was displayed, and then the second object appeared either
0 (simultaneously), 33, 83, 133, 183, or 233 ms later. Instructions
were in two different forms (see Figure 2). The first was, “is X
(Direction) of Y?” where X and Y were “r” for red and “g” for
green and (Direction) was “L” for left and “R” for right. Questions
were displayed as “X(Direction)Y?” Participants responded with
yes or no using the Y and N keys on the keyboard. The second
form of instructions was, “Which is (Direction)?” In this ques-
tion type (Direction) was “L” for left and “R” for right. Questions
were displayed as “w(Direction)?” For these trial types, partici-
pants responded with red or green using the R and F keys on the
keyboard. The F key was used instead of the G key for green so
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Potential instruction displays for Experiment 1. (B)
Illustration of a potential trial sequence. After a fixation point, one of the
objects in the relation appears in either the second or third positions
(dotted black lines) of four possible positions (dotted black and gray
lines). Because the other object could appear on either side, this
display gave no information about the relation between the objects.
After a delay (0–233 ms), the second object appears and the participant
could give their response.
that the vertical arrangement of the keys on the keyboard could
reduce potential directional biasing. The F key was labeled with a
letter G to avoid confusion.
Results and discussion
Three subjects were omitted from the analysis due to a fail-
ure to complete the experiment. One subject was omitted due
to particularly low accuracy (85%), and one was omitted due
to an average response time more than 2 SDs above the mean.
Twenty-six subjects remained in the analysis. Accuracy rates
were 96% (SD= 1.94%) and average response time was 755 ms
(SD= 129 ms). Trials with incorrect responses or responses of
over 1500 ms were removed from the analysis. Figure 3 depicts
the main effects within the data collapsed over the timing manip-
ulations. Note that the Figure does not depict “baseline” RTs, only
differences in RT between different conditions. Analysis of vari-
ance below will include baseline RT as a factor, and significant
changes in RT across timings are described in the Appendix.
Is (target) (direction) of (reference). The left side of Figure 3
shows analyses of questions of the form “Is (target) (direction)
of (reference)?” Showing the target object before the reference
object led to faster response times. For the target/reference analy-
sis, response times were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures
analysis of variance, with object appearance order (target first,
reference first) and timing (0, 33, 83, 133, 183, 233 ms) as variables.
Responses were faster when the question’s target object appeared
first (M =−15.5 ms) supported by a significant main effect of
object appearance order F(1, 25)= 9.2, p= 0.006. For the direc-
tion term consistency analysis, response times were submitted to a
2× 6 repeated measures analysis of variance, with direction term
consistency (direction term consistent with object that appears
first, e.g., “left” when left object appears first, or inconsistent) and
timing as variables. There was a trend for direction consistency to
improve response times (M =−10.2 ms), F(1, 25)= 3.5, p= 0.07.
See Appendix for additional analyses.
Which is (Direction). The right side of Figure 3 shows analyses
of questions of the form “Which is (Direction)?” There was no
main effect of direction term consistency (whether the first object
appeared on the side named by the directional term). A 2× 6
repeated measures analysis of variance, with direction term consis-
tency and timing as variables, revealed no main effect of direction
consistency on response times (M =−8.8 ms), F(1, 25)= 0.8,
p= 0.4. See Appendix for additional analyses.
EXPERIMENT 2: ABOVE/BELOW RELATIONS, WITH ONE OBJECT
APPEARING BEFORE THE OTHER
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except that objects
were arranged vertically instead of horizontally. The questions
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Response time benefit:  
Which color is Dir?  
Response time benefit:  
Is Targ Dir of Ref? 
* 
(*) 
-40 
ms ** 
Targ 1st Dir Con 
Ref 1st Dir Incon 
E1 
-40 
** 
E2 E1 
E2 
-40 
ms 
-40 
Dir Con 
Dir Incon 
E1 E2 
-40 
ms 
-40 
FIGURE 3 | Response time benefits for Experiments 1 and 2. The first
graph (gray bars), depicts response times advantages for the “Is Target
Direction of Reference?” question type. Values toward graph top indicate
faster responses for trials where the “target” object appeared first, and
values toward graph bottom indicate faster responses for trials where the
“reference” object appeared first. In the second graph (black bars), values
toward graph top indicate faster responses for trials where object
consistent with the directional term (e.g., the left object for “left”
questions) appeared first, and values toward graph bottom indicate faster
responses for trials of the opposite case. The third graph (black bars)
depicts response time advantages for the “Which Color is Direction?”
question type, using the same “direction consistency” analysis as the
second graph. Asterisks indicate significant effects, an asterisk in
parentheses indicates a marginal effect.
shown before each block of eight trials were now depicted horizon-
tally so that reading order would be orthogonal to the dimension
of the judged relation.
Methods
Participants. Fourteen undergraduate students at Northwest-
ern University participated in the 25-min session in exchange for
course credit.
Apparatus and stimuli. Stimuli were identical to those in Exper-
iment 1 except that the objects were aligned vertically instead
of horizontally, horizontally centered on the display, with the
fixation point in between the middle two objects. Because the
vertically-oriented question displays from the previous experi-
ment would now have a confounded reading order, the present
displays used horizontally oriented questions, now written out in
standard English.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1
with the following exceptions. The trials were blocked by tim-
ing between the appearance of the two objects, and the order
of these blocks was randomized. For questions of the form, “is
X (Direction) of Y?” X and Y were “red” or “green” and (Direc-
tion) was “Above” and “Below.” Questions were displayed as “X
(Direction) Y?” Participants responded to these questions using Y
(Yes) and U (No) keys on the keyboard. The U key was labeled
with the letter “N,” and was used instead of the N key so that the
horizontal arrangement of the keys on the keyboard could fur-
ther reduce directional biasing. For questions of the form, “which
is (Direction)?” (Direction) was “Above” and “Below.” Questions
were displayed as “which is (Direction)?” For these trial types,
participants responded with red or green using the R and T keys
on the keyboard. The T key was used instead of the G key for green
so that the horizontal arrangement of the keys on the keyboard
could further reduce directional biasing. The T key was labeled
with a letter “G” to avoid confusion.
Results and Discussion
Accuracy rates were 95% (SD= 2.54%) and average response
time was 767 ms (SD= 110 ms). Trials with incorrect responses
or responses of over 1500 ms were removed from the analysis.
Figure 3 depicts the various ways that data were collapsed for
analysis.
Is (target) (direction) of (reference). Figure 3 shows analyses
of questions of the form “Is (target) (direction) of (reference)?”
identical to those for Experiment 1. Again, displaying the target
object before the reference object led to faster response times.
Response times for the target/reference analysis were submitted to
a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis of variance, with object appear-
ance order and timing as variables. Responses were faster when
the question’s target object appeared first (M =−19.3 ms), sup-
ported by a significant main effect of object appearance order F(1,
13)= 9.3, p= 0.009. For the direction term consistency analysis,
there was a marginal consistency advantage. Response times were
submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis of variance, with
direction term consistency and timing as variables. The main effect
of direction consistency was marginally significant (M = 18.3 ms),
F(1, 13)= 4.0, p= 0.07. See Appendix for additional analyses.
Which is (Direction). The right sides of Figure 3 shows analyses
of questions of the form “Which is (Direction)?” and here there
was a main effect of direction consistency such that responses were
faster when the first object appeared on the side named by the
directional term. Response times for the direction term consistency
analysis were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis of
variance, with direction term consistency and timing as variables.
There was a main effect of direction consistency on response times
(M =−31.4 ms), F(1, 12)= 5.4, p= 0.04, reflecting an advantage
when objects appeared in a direction consistent with the term used
in the question. See Appendix for additional analyses.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We tested whether the position of the attentional spotlight affects
visual representations of relations by determining the direction
of asymmetry within that relation. Experiment 1 tested left/right
relations, while Experiment 2 tested above/below relations. We
manipulated attention by precueing one object within the pair,
and this precue affected compatibility with the linguistic framing
of the question that participants were asked to verify. The most
robust example was the type of compatibility for which we had a
strong a priori prediction – target/reference designations for ques-
tions of the form, “Is (target) (direction) of (reference)?” In both
experiments, participant responses were faster when the “target”
object appeared before the “reference” object, an order that follows
the ordering within the question.
For these questions, there were no robust effects suggesting
response time advantages when the direction term in the question
was consistent with appearance order. For questions of the form
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“Which is (Direction)?” both experiments show some response
time advantages when the first object appears on the side named
by the direction term (e.g., for “Which is left,” responses are faster
when the left object appears first). This effect was weak in Experi-
ment 1 (specific to one timing value, see Appendix),and was a main
effect for Experiment 2. However, the direction consistency bene-
fits from these simpler questions are more difficult to interpret. If
the results had shown the opposite effect, such that response times
were faster when the second object appeared on the side named
by the directional term, it could have indicated an advantage for
trials where the attentional “spotlight” traveled in that direction.
For example, when asking, “Which is left,” some versions of the
attentional shift account would predict better performance after a
leftward shift, which should simultaneously produce the represen-
tation of the shift direction (left) plus the color of the object on
that side of the relation. But because the results suggest that the
identity of the first object matters, we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that the preview of the first object primed the response to
that object’s color identity, regardless of any effects of that preview
on relational processing. Thus, given the current results we cannot
draw any firm conclusions from these directional questions.
In summary, the most diagnostic results stem from the tar-
get/reference analysis across the “Is (target) (direction) of (ref-
erence)?” questions, which show that previewing the linguistic
target object slightly before the reference object (the same tem-
poral ordering as the question) speeds response times for both
left/right and above/below judgments. Attentional manipulations
do affect the compatibility of visual representations with asym-
metric linguistic representations, providing evidence that visual
representations of relations may be similarly asymmetric.
Note that following the order prescribed by the sentence reveals
an interesting potential property of the perceptual representation:
following that order produces the “wrong” relational term within
the attention shift model. For example, given an image of (red
green) and the question “Is red left of green?” according to our
account, following the order of the question would produce (red)
and then (rightward+ green). For this representation to be com-
patible with the surface form of the linguistic representation, the
visual mechanism would have to“flip”the directional term (chang-
ing “right” to “left”). This flip is counterintuitive, but certainly not
computationally difficult.
A deeper understanding of how these asymmetries interact will
require additional converging evidence for how attention moves
within such simple displays of relations, as well as new data using
other types of cueing methods (e.g., transient events that occur
near or on two existing objects, instead of having one object appear
at a different time point). Ongoing work in our laboratory does
show that using other measures besides attentional cueing (eye-
tracking and electrophysiological attention tracking techniques),
we find that the eyes and attention are controlled in the same ways
as suggested here. That is, when engaged in a sentence-picture
matching task, the eyes (and attention) shift toward the relational
“target” object (Franconeri et al., 2012). Note that, by themselves,
such tracking results could not show a causal effect of attentional
allocation in the way that the present studies do.
The idea that visual relation representations are asymmet-
ric is consistent with our account of visual relation processing
(Franconeri et al., 2012),which predicts that the visual system pro-
vides a serial stream of information about the relations between
objects in a scene, one relation at a time. If visual relations are
processed in such a serial fashion, why do we feel as if we have a
more detailed percept of the relations around us? One possibility is
that other visual information about the objects within the relation
supports this percept of detail, such as how many are present (Fran-
coneri et al., 2009), the global shape of their arrangement (Sanocki
and Sulman, 2009), and statistical information about their iden-
tities (Ariely, 2001). Individual relations may be produced “on
demand” so quickly that they give the conscious impression that
they were already available (Rensink et al., 1997; Noe and O’Regan,
2000). For example, an observer might automatically process both
“sides” of an asymmetric relation to know both that red is left and
green is right, such that the percept of that relation feels symmetric.
Given the present results, how certain could we be that per-
ceptual representations of relations are asymmetric? For example,
what if the attentional cueing manipulation affected an interme-
diate (and asymmetric) representation between perception and
language, while perceptual representations are actually symmetric?
While we cannot rule out this possibility, we find our conclusion
more parsimonious. Given what is known about how the visual
system might process spatial relationships, we argue a priori that
its representation of categorical relations should be asymmetric.
Without a specification of the nature of this potential “interme-
diate” representation, this alternative account seems difficult to
falsify. Furthermore, this intermediate representation would also
have to be affected by the precueing manipulation, which par-
ticipants knew to be irrelevant to their task, and which should
primarily affect perceptual representations. Another similar cri-
tique would be that the perceptual representation is symmetric,
but that translating that representation into one that is com-
patible with language requires that it be somehow reformatted,
e.g., to match the serial order of the sentence. If so, then a more
conservative version of our claim would be that the subset of per-
ceptual representations that potentially interfaces with language is
asymmetric. But this subset would include the vast majority (and
perhaps all) useful spatial relationship judgments that the mind
constructs.
MUST PERCEPTUAL RELATION REPRESENTATIONS BE ASYMMETRIC?
There may be other types of “relational” perceptual representa-
tions that do not involve the same type of asymmetry as sug-
gested here. In particular, there may be visual representations that
allow other forms of relational information to be represented in
a less explicitly asymmetric way. For example, some models of
performance in similar tasks specify underlying perceptual rep-
resentations that are more “holistic” or “pictorial” than linguistic
descriptions given enough encoding time (e.g., Seymour, 1969;
Tversky, 1975; Glushko and Cooper, 1978; Reichle et al., 2000;
see also similar issues regarding representations underlying men-
tal imagery, e.g., Anderson, 1978; Kosslyn, 1994; Pylyshyn, 2003).
One study demonstrated that when a sentence was shown before
the picture, and participants had plenty of time to recode the
depicted relations into a “pictorial” format, the markedness and
sentence complexity effects that underlie the claims of studies such
as Clark and Chase (1972) disappear. Instead, these authors argued
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that participants could match the subsequent image with a picto-
rial representation in a holistic manner (Glushko and Cooper,
1978).
How do such results relate to the present evidence for asymmet-
ric perceptual representations? We believe that while it might be
possible to create a pictorial representation that could be compared
against a subsequent picture, it will only be possible if the “rela-
tion” has an existing holistic representation in the ventral visual
system. For example, in the Glushko and Cooper (1978) study,
the type of stimuli used (a small set of close arrangements of
squares and triangles) could be recoded into global shapes (e.g.,
the relation of “triangle above square1; square2 left of square1”
would be uniquely identifiable as a global “L” shape). In another
study making similar claims, the “relation” of eyes above a mouth
in a cartoon face almost certainly has an existing holistic repre-
sentation in the visual system, which could explain the ability of
participants to quickly build “holistic” representations of cartoon
faces of different shapes (Tversky, 1969). Such well-learned stimuli
contrast with the more arbitrary color pair relations used in stud-
ies such as Clark and Chase (1972) as well as the present studies.
In those cases, it is less clear how relations among objects could be
represented holistically or pictorially.
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES PERCEPTION LEAN ON LANGUAGE?
How could a serial attentional process be controlled, and how
could the intermediate and final results of this routine be stored?
One primary system underlying the solution to each of these
problems may be language itself, or a similar representation that
could store more complex or hierarchical relations. More complex
relations among multiple objects would require language, or a
language-like representation (Cavanagh, 2004), to guide the spot-
light of selection across objects, or groups of objects, in the proper
order to produce the needed conclusion (e.g., the group contain-
ing the red object left of the green object is under the blue bar), and
to store the results of that sequence (see Landau et al., 2010, for
a review of similar arguments). This possibility is consistent with
the close ties between the movements of the eyes and attention
within scenes and the comprehension and production of linguis-
tic descriptions of those scenes (e.g., Altmann and Kamide, 1999,
2007; Gleitman et al., 2007).
Our account of visual relation processing may actually require
a system such as language to deal with all but the most primitive
relations. Two recent studies suggest that language may indeed
play a role in creating representations of visually presented spatial
relations. In one study, hearing spatial language helped children
encode the spatial relations among a set of three objects, allowing
them to pick out objects in the same relational role (as opposed
to the same identity) in a second set of objects (Loewenstein and
Gentner, 2005). In another, when children were given objects that
were red on one side and green on the other, performance in a later
matching task showed good memory for the shape of the object,
but poor performance for the left-right spatial relation between
the colors. Adding spatial language during the encoding display
improved their performance when that language included infor-
mation about the color and direction of one of the objects (e.g.,
“the red is on the left”) (Dessalegn and Landau, 2008). Language
may guide attention through the relation in a way that creates a
more robust short-term representation of that relation, as opposed
to a less optimal strategy of attempting to attend to multiple objects
at once. In addition to language serving as a guide for attention,
it may also serve to ensure that the sequence of guidance is the
same across encoding and test periods, so that the children do not
attempt to compare an encoded relation of “the red is on the left of
green” with a different representation of “the green is on the right
of red.”
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APPENDIX
ALTERNATIVE COMPATIBILITY ANALYSES AND PRECUE TIMING
ANALYSES
Timing analyses: Methods
Manipulations of attention with transient cues can be sensitive
to timing. The cues take some time to have an effect (typically
at least 150 ms), and fade quickly (after around 300 ms), and can
even result in an inhibitory effect after even more time has passed
(Nakayama and Mackeben, 1989; Klein, 2000). Therefore, in addi-
tion to manipulating which object appeared first (was cued), we
also systematically manipulated the timing of this event. We added
this manipulation for exploratory purposes, and had no a priori
expectations about how they might affect the patterns of response
times. While much is known about how these timing manipula-
tions affect processes such as object identification, it is difficult to
predict how they might affect more complex processing of spatial
relationships, and the integration of those representations with
linguistic descriptions. A detailed look at interactions involving
timing will lead to lower power because our design produces
seven ways of examining potential asymmetries that might be
present in the visual representation (four for the “Is red left of
green?” style questions: target vs. reference, directional term con-
sistency, absolute color preference, absolute direction preference;
three for the “Which color is left?” style questions: same as above
but without target vs. reference). These seven asymmetry types
times the six timings produce 42 condition averages for each of
the two experiments, and therefore a high likelihood of type I
(false positive) errors. We therefore include this manipulation for
exploratory purposes for future work, and focus primarily on the
main effect of which object is cued instead of the timing of that cue.
All timing interactions are reported with a conservative Bonferroni
correction.
EXPERIMENT 1: FULL DATA ANALYSIS
Three subjects were omitted from the analysis due to a failure to
complete the experiment. One subject was omitted due to par-
ticularly low accuracy (85%), and one was omitted due to an
average response time more than 2 standard deviations above the
mean. Twenty-six subjects remained in the analysis. Accuracy rates
were 96% (SD= 1.94%) and average response time was 755 ms
(SD= 129 ms). Trials with incorrect responses or responses of
over 1500 ms were removed from the analysis. Figure 3 depicts
the main effects within the data collapsed over the timing manip-
ulations. Figure A1 depicts main effects for analyses discussed
below but not in the manuscript. Note that these figures do not
depict “baseline” RTs, only differences in RT between different
conditions. ANOVA analysis below will include baseline RT as a
factor, and significant changes in RT across timings are described
in the text. In Figure A2A, the average left/right position of a line
collapsed across the y-axis of timing reflects the main effect of the
factors described on the x-axis. The shape of the line reflects the
interaction between that factor and timing.
Is (target) (direction) of (reference)
The left side of Figure A2A shows analyses of questions of the
form “Is (target) (direction) of (reference)?” The upper left graph
focuses on the compatibility between the question structure and
Response time benefit:  Response time benefit:  
-40 
ms 
Red 1st Left/Above 1st 
Green1st  Right/Below 1st 
E1 
-40 
E2 
E1 E2 
-40 
ms 
-40 
Which color is L/R ?  [E1 ] Is R/G  L/R of R/G ?  [E1 ] 
Left/Above 1st 
Right/Below 1st 
E1 E2 
-40 
ms 
-40 
(*) 
Which color is A/B?  [E2 ] Is R/G  A/B of R/G ?  [E2 ] 
FIGURE A1 | Response time benefits for Experiments 1 and 2. The first
graph (grey bars), depicts response times advantages for the “Is Target
Direction of Reference?” question type. Values toward graph top indicate
faster responses for trials where the Red object appeared first, and values
toward graph bottom indicate faster responses for trials where the Green
object appeared first. In the second graph (black bars), values toward graph
top indicate faster responses for trials where Left (E1) or Above (E2) object
appeared first, and values toward graph bottom indicate faster responses
for trials of the opposite cases.The third graph depicts equivalent results for
the “Which Color is Direction?” question type. *Indicates a single marginal
effect (which would not survive a multiple comparisons correction).
the appearance order of the objects. The analysis was collapsed
according to whether the question’s target or reference object
appeared first (the gray lines), and according to whether the direc-
tion term queried (left or right) was consistent with the relative
position of the object that appeared first (the black lines). Both of
these analyses collapse across the other aspect of the question, as
well as the absolute left/right order of animation, and the absolute
red/green color of the object. Note that these potential cues for
selecting one object are orthogonal to each other, and therefore
compete. We predicted that for these question types, one of the
cues would be likely to dominate the other.
Data for the target/reference analysis (gray line in upper left
graph of Figure A2A) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated mea-
sures analysis of variance, with object appearance order (target
first, reference first) and timing (0, 33, 83, 133, 183, 233 ms) as
variables. Responses were faster when the question’s target object
appeared first (M =−15.5 ms) supported by a significant main
effect of object appearance order F(1, 25)= 9.2, p= 0.006. There
were also differences in RT (not visible in the graph) across timings,
revealed by a main effect of timing F(5, 125)= 8.4, p < 0.001. This
main effect of timing is similar for the remaining analyses and will
be omitted below. These differences were driven by faster response
times for longer animation timings (e.g., 233 ms), in a roughly
linear trend. There was also an interaction between object appear-
ance order and timing (visible in the variability of the gray line in
the upper left graph of Figure A2A), F(5, 125)= 3.4, p= 0.007,
reflecting a larger advantage when the target appeared first at the
83 ms [t (25)= 2.8, p= 0.009] and 133 ms [t (25)= 3.8, p < 0.001]
timing, with both values passing the Bonferroni correction. Data
for the direction term consistency analysis (black line in upper left
graph of Figure A2A) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures
analysis of variance, with direction term consistency (direction
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term consistent with object that appears first, e.g., “left” when
left object appears first, or inconsistent) and timing as variables.
There was a trend for direction consistency to improve response
times (M =−10.2 ms), F(1, 25)= 3.5, p= 0.07. There was no
interaction between direction term consistency and timing, F(5,
125)= 1.6, p= 0.2.
The analyses of the bottom left graph of Figure A2A ignore
the structure of the question, and instead focus on which color
appeared first within the display (red or green), which would
reveal a processing priority for a given color, or which side the
first object appeared on, which would reveal a processing prior-
ity for a given side of appearance. Both of these analyses collapse
across the other aspect of the display. Data for the color prior-
ity analysis (gray line in lower left graph of Figure A2A) were
submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis of variance, with
color appearance order (red first, green first) and timing as vari-
ables. There was no main effect revealing an advantage for a
given color across timings (M = 2.0 ms), F(1, 25)= 0.08, p= 0.8.
The interaction between object appearance order and timing was
significant, F(5, 125)= 2.5, p= 0.03, reflecting faster RTs for tri-
als where red appeared first at the 133 ms timing [t (25)= 2.3,
p= 0.03] and where green appeared first at the 83 ms timing
[t (25)= 2.6, p= 0.02].
Data for the direction priority analysis (black line in lower left
graph of Figure A2A) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures
analysis of variance, with direction appearance order (left first,
right first) and timing as variables. There was no main effect of
direction appearance order (M = 5.3 ms), F(1, 25)= 0.7, p= 0.4.
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FIGURE A2 | Continued
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FIGURE A2 | (A) Response time results for Experiment 1 (Left/Right relations). **Indicates an effect passing Bonferroni correction p<0.008 (*), indicates
0.008<p<0.05. (B) Response time results for Experiment 2 (above/below relations). **Indicates an effect passing Bonferroni correction p< 0.008 (*),
indicates 0.008<p<0.05.
The interaction between object appearance order and timing was
significant, F(5, 125)= 3.4, p= 0.007, reflecting faster RTs for tri-
als where the object on the right appeared first at the 233 ms
[t (25)= 3.0, p= 0.006] and 133 ms [t (25)= 2.6, p= 0.01] tim-
ings, and faster RTs for trials where the object on the left appeared
first at the 183 ms timing [t (25)= 2.0, p= 0.06]. Only the 233 ms
timing difference passed the Bonferroni correction.
In summary, for the questions of the form “Is (target) (direc-
tion) of (reference)?”showing the target object before the reference
object led to faster response times. While we examine differences
within appearance order timings with caution, these differences
seem to be driven by the 83 and 133 ms timings. When collaps-
ing across these questions, there were no main effects of the color
or relative position of the first object. While there were hints of
interactions among these factors with timing, none of these effects
reached a sufficiently high significance threshold except for an
advantage for displays where the right object appeared 233 ms
before the left object.
Which is (Direction)
The right side of Figure A2A shows analyses of questions of the
form “Which is (Direction)?” For the graphs at the upper right of
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Roth and Franconeri Asymmetric spatial relationship coding
Figure A2A, the analysis is identical to the graph at the upper left
of Figure A2A, except that the target/reference analysis (gray line
in the upper left graph of Figure A2A) is omitted. For the graph
at the lower right of Figure A2A, analysis is identical to the graph
at the lower left of Figure A2A.
Data for the direction term consistency analysis (black line in
upper right graph of Figure A2A) were submitted to a 2× 6
repeated measures analysis of variance, with direction term consis-
tency and timing as variables. There was no main effect of direction
consistency on response times (M =−8.8 ms), F(1, 25)= 0.8,
p= 0.4. There were baseline RT differences across timings (not vis-
ible in graph), F(3.6, 88.8)= 4.5, p= 0.004 (Greenhouse Geisser
correction). These differences were driven by RTs that were sig-
nificantly higher than average (M = 664 ms) for the 0 ms timing
[t (25)= 3.5, p= 0.002], as well as RTs that were significantly less
than the average for the 233 ms timing [t (25)= 2.5, p= 0.02].
There was also an interaction between direction term consistency
and timing, F(3.4, 85.3)= 4.0, p= 0.008 (Greenhouse Geisser cor-
rection), reflecting faster RTs for trials with direction consistency at
the 183 ms [t (25)= 2.9, p= 0.008], 33 ms [t (25)= 2.2, p= 0.04]
and 0 ms [t (25)= 2.6, p= 0.02] timings. The significance of this
last test demonstrates why we examine any condition× timing
interactions in an exploratory and speculative fashion. This test
suggests a difference between two conditions that we know to
be identical, and is therefore a false positive (to be expected
given the 42 such potential tests in each experiment). Thus,
in the Section “Discussion” section below, we discuss only the
interaction found for the 183 ms timing, which was significant
according to a more conservative Bonferroni-corrected threshold
(p= 0.008).
Data for the color priority analysis (gray line in lower right
graph of Figure A2A) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures
analysis of variance, with color appearance order (red first, green
first) and timing as variables. There was no main effect reveal-
ing an advantage for a given color across timings (M = 3.2 ms),
F(1, 25)= 0.4, p= 0.5. The interaction between object appearance
order and timing was not significant, F(5, 125)= 0.8, p= 0.6. Data
for the direction priority analysis (black line in lower right graph of
Figure A2A) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis
of variance, with direction appearance order (left first, right first)
and timing as variables. There was no main effect of direction
appearance order (M =−18.0 ms), F(1, 25)= 2.8, p= 0.1. There
was a significant interaction between object appearance order and
timing, F(5, 125)= 3.0, p= 0.01, reflecting faster RTs for trials
where the object on the left appeared first at the 233 ms timing
[t (25)= 3.7, p= 0.001].
In summary, for the simpler questions of the form “Which
is (Direction)?” there was no main effect of direction consis-
tency (whether the first object appeared on the side named
by the directional term), but there was a direction consis-
tency× timing interaction driven by a significant consistency
advantage at the 183 ms timing. For the analyses that collapse
across question, there were no main effects of the color or rel-
ative position of the first object, though there was a relative
advantage when the left object appeared 233 ms before the right
object.
EXPERIMENT 2: FULL DATA ANALYSIS
Accuracy rates were 95% (SD= 2.54%) and average response
time was 767 ms (SD= 110 ms). Trials with incorrect responses
or responses of over 1500 ms were removed from the analysis.
Figure 3 depicts the main effects within the data collapsed over the
timing manipulations. Figure A1 depicts main effects for analyses
discussed below but not in the manuscript.
Is (target) (direction) of (reference)
The left side of Figure A2B shows analyses of questions of the form
“Is (target) (direction) of (reference)?” identical to those for Exper-
iment 1. Data for the target/reference analysis (gray line in upper
left graph of Figure A2B) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated mea-
sures analysis of variance, with object appearance order and timing
as variables. Responses were faster when the question’s target
object appeared first (M =−19.3 ms), supported by a significant
main effect of object appearance order F(1, 13)= 9.3, p= 0.009.
There were also differences in RT across timings, revealed by a main
effect of timing F(5, 65)= 2.9, p= 0.02. These differences were
driven by RTs that were greater than the average (M = 695 ms)
for the 0 ms timing [t (13)= 3.2, p= 0.008], as well as RTs that
were less than the average for the 183 ms timing [t (13)= 2.2,
p= 0.05]. There was also an interaction between object appear-
ance order and timing, F(5,65)= 2.4, p= 0.05, reflecting a lack
of target consistency advantage when the target appeared first at
the 0 ms timing. Data for the direction term consistency analysis
(black line in upper left graph of Figure A2B) were submitted
to a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis of variance, with direction
term consistency and timing as variables. There was no main effect
of direction consistency (M = 18.3 ms), F(1, 13)= 4.0, p= 0.07.
There was no interaction between direction term consistency and
timing, F(5, 65)= 1.9, p= 0.1.
Data for the color priority analysis (gray line in lower left graph
of Figure A2B) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures analy-
sis of variance, with color appearance order and timing as vari-
ables. There was no main effect revealing an advantage for a given
color across timings (M =−11.4 ms), F(1, 13)= 1.7, p= 0.2. The
interaction between object appearance order and timing was not
significant, F(5, 65)= 0.5, p= 0.8. Data for the direction priority
analysis (black line in lower left graph of Figure A2B) were submit-
ted to a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis of variance,with direction
appearance order and timing as variables. There was a trend for
a main effect of direction appearance order (M = 17.4 ms), F(1,
13)= 4.4, p= 0.06, reflecting faster RTs when the object on the
bottom appeared first. The interaction between object appear-
ance order and timing was significant, F(5, 65)= 2.7, p= 0.03,
reflecting faster RTs for trials where the object on the bottom
appeared first at the 233 ms [t (13)= 6.2, p < 0.0001] and 183 ms
[t (13)= 2.2, p= 0.05] timings.
In summary, for the questions of the form “Is (target) (direc-
tion) of (reference)?” displaying the target object before the ref-
erence object led to faster response times. When collapsing across
these questions, there were no main effects of the color of the
first object, but there were effects involving the position of this
object. Specifically, response times were faster when the bottom
object appeared first, and this advantage was driven by the longest
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timings, most robustly the trials were there was a 233 ms preview
of the bottom object.
Which is (Direction)
The right side of Figure A2B shows analyses of questions of the
form “Which is (Direction)?” Data for the direction term consis-
tency analysis (black line in upper right graph of Figure A2B)
were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance, with direction term consistency and timing as variables.
There was a main effect of direction consistency on response times
(M =−31.4 ms), F(1, 12)= 5.4, p= 0.04, reflecting an advantage
when objects appeared in a direction consistent with the term
used in the question. There were no baseline RT differences across
timings, F(5, 60)= 0.3, p= 0.9. There was no interaction between
direction term consistency and timing, F(5, 60)= 1.6, p= 0.2.
Data for the color priority analysis (gray line in lower right
graph of Figure A2B) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated mea-
sures analysis of variance, with color appearance and timing
as variables. There was no main effect revealing an advantage
for a given color across timings (M =−9.4 ms), F(1, 13)= 1.3,
p= 0.3. The interaction between object appearance order and
timing was not significant, F(5, 65)= 0.8, p= 0.5. Data for the
direction priority analysis (black line in lower right graph of
Figure A2B) were submitted to a 2× 6 repeated measures analysis
of variance, with direction appearance order and timing as vari-
ables. There was no main effect of direction appearance order
(M =−14.0 ms), F(1, 13)= 1.1, p= 0.3. There was no signifi-
cant interaction between object appearance order and timing, F(5,
65)= 1.7, p= 0.1.
In summary, for the simpler questions of the form “Which is
(Direction)?” there was a main effect of direction consistency such
that responses were faster when the first object appeared on the
side named by the directional term.
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